IIF   26912
INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES FILOSOFICAS
Unidad Ejecutora - UE
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
I-Thoughts and I-Concepts: a Defence of Ezcurdia?s Conception
Autor/es:
PEREZ, DIANA; ORLANDO, ELEONORA
Lugar:
México DF
Reunión:
Simposio; Homenaje a Maite Ezcurdia; 2019
Institución organizadora:
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM
Resumen:
In the main paper we consider here, Maite Ezcurdia argues for her position, opposing philosophers like Perry (1986) and Recanati (2007), who think that some I-thoughts do not involve I-concepts. An I-thought is analysed in terms of a psychological relation between (i) a subject, (ii) a centred proposition or propositional function that is to be evaluated at that subject (not just at her possible world and time). Having an I-thought amounts to self-ascribing a property ?a property that is true or false of oneself: the subject of the state is a constituent not of the propositional content but of the situation relative to which the content is to be evaluated as true or false. (In Kaplan (1977)?s terms, it is a parameter of the circumstances of evaluation, together with the time and the possible world in which the property is self-ascribed). That is why Recanati presents the view as a version of Moderate Relativism (what MacFarlane has called ?Non-Indexical Contextualism?), and also why Maite characterises her position as involving a critique of relativism about I-thoughts. In what follows, we will briefly reconstruct some of her main arguments against Perry and Recanati that make manifest some aspects of her position we think can get further support.