Who says scientific laws are not explanatory? On a curious clash between science education and philosophy of science

EDELSZTEIN, VALERIA; CORMICK, CLAUDIO

SCIENCE & EDUCATION (DORDRECHT)

SPRINGER

Lugar: Berlin; Año: 2023

0926-7220

In this article, we tackle the phenomenon of what seems to be a misunderstandingbetween science education theory and philosophy of science−one which does notseem to have received any attention in the literature. While there seems to be aconsensus within the realm of science education on limiting or altogether denying theexplanatory role of scientific laws (particularly in contrast with “theories”), none of thecanonical models of scientific explanation (covering law, statistical relevance,unification, mechanistic-causal, pragmatic) lends any support to this view of laws. Wewill reconstruct three different versions of this demotion of laws (i.e., laws are merelydescriptive; laws are explanatory only of singular events, not of laws; laws areexplanatory but only in a “superficial” way), propose possible grounds for them andillustrate why these perspectives pose a conceptual challenge as they contrast withepistemological approaches to the problem of explanation. We will also suggest thepotential negative outcomes that would arise from science teachers adopting theseapproaches in the classroom when aiming to assist students in moving beyond meredescription and towards explanation.