SIGNIFICADO Y MENTE EN DE INTERPRETATIONE 1-6

FABIAN MIE

Buenos Aires

Jornada; Primeras Jornadas de Filosofía Antigua; 2017

Academia Nacional de Ciencias De Buenos Aires

Aristotle?s concerns with meaning, mind, and language in the compact opening lines of De Interpretatione (16a3-8), together with the sequel of the next six chapters, have been read contemporarily in heavily different ways which span from charging the theory with serious weaknesses (Ackrill) to stating that 16a3-8 is the most influential text in the history of semantics (Kretzmann). While some authors contend that Aristotle?s really match with what we currently call a theory of ?meaning? (Irwin), others believe that Aristotle?s views on meaning are a useful tool for his further treatises (Modrak). Discrepancies also concern the kind of project this text carries out, whether it is linked to Aristotle?s psychological explanation of mental representation (Modrak, Charles) or it rather serves for dialectical refutation (Whitaker). In spite of such discrepancies, it is held almost without exception among interpreters that Aristotle explains meaning in terms of mental representation, and that he takes mental representation to be a sort of mental image which produces a likeness to the external object. In view of this state of the art, I will approach Aristotle?s theory of meaning by siding with those (Polansky and Kuczewski) who primarily aim to clarify each relevant concept included in 16a3-8. This I consider to be a necessary step to support two main suggestions. First, I will claim that Aristotle is committed to a moderate linguistic conventionalism by means of which  besides putting forward Plato?s discussion in the Cratylus  he can manage to preserve the intentional content of significant sounds, in that he explains that humans mentally grasp the world as it is. So Aristotle gives an account of meaning in an externalist manner, which is of a piece with his realism about beliefs, scientific knowledge, and language. Second, I will give several reasons for further explaining meaning as the content of a significant sound on the basis of the intellect rather than of imagination. As a result I argue here for exonerating Aristotle from the common blame of having accepted both a natural relation (likeness) to secure the reference of words and an associated picture theory.