Variedades de corrección doxástica

LAURA DANÓN; DANIEL ENRIQUE KALPOKAS

Jornada; Filosofía de las mentes animales; 2020

If we focus on current debates on how creatures correct their beliefs, we can identify two opposing approaches that we propose to call ?intellectualism? and ?minimalism.? In this paper, we propose a new account of doxastic correction? ?the first-order model?? that is neither as cognitively demanding as intellectualism nor as deflationary as minimalism. First-order doxastic correction, we argue, is a personal level process in which a creature actively rejects some beliefs and accepts others, based on reasons. However, it does not involve second order-thinking or sophisticated semantic and epistemic concepts. Besides defending that there is conceptual space for this alternative, we explore the possibility of extending it to some non-human animals. Based on our interpretation of some empirical evidence, we conclude that there are initial reasons to think that some animals ? i.e., chimpanzees?, may be capable of correcting their beliefs in the way that our first-order model suggests.