Second Person Intentionality

SCOTTO, SILVIA CAROLINA

Santiago de Chile

Workshop; Joint Practical Knowledge. Shared Agency and Knowledge of Other Minds.; 2016

Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Chile

In this contribution, my aim is arguing for that a kind of second person intentionality is the positive answer to the question: ?what is it the most basic form of human intentionality, between first singular, second, third and first person plural?? I wish to defend too that this question must be distinguish from a different (but related) one: ?What is it the hallmark of human intentionality?? (that has a brentanian resonance), whose answer is, in my opinion: collective intentionality or ?we-intentionality?. These two different questions and their respective different answers may accommodate our knowledge and intuitions about the singularity of human cognition (or human intentionality) on an evolutionary and developmental naturalist framework, avoiding some dilemmas or difficulties faced to explain the structure, roles, presuppositions and nature of ?I?, ?You?, ?She/He? and ?We? mode and contents of thinking (on a liberal sense of the word).