Intelectualismo vs. Empirismo

FEDERICO CASTELLANO

Rosario

Congreso; Coloquio Internacional de Análisis Filosófico: lenguaje, conocimiento y acción; 2013

SADAF/CEFILE-UNR

There is a well-known philosophical tradition called Intellectualism which argues that thinking essentially involves the activity of reason-giving (Brewer 1999, 2005; Brandom 1994, 2002b, 2010; Davidson 1982, 1997; McDowell 1994, 2009a, 2009b; Sellars 1991). In this paper I argue that the intellectualist point of view is incompatible with any form of empiricism. First, I show that Traditional Empiricism collapses because it brings together two conflicting theses: the intellectualist thesis according to which the normative properties of conceptual thoughts depend (rest) upon the activity of reason-giving, and the intuitive empiricist thesis according to which the normative properties of empirical conceptual thoughts derive from perceptual experiences. Second, I argue that McDowell?s Minimal Empiricism collapses as well because of his attempt to make sense of an over-intellectualized and contradictory variety of empiricism: one that preserves both the intellectualist approach to conceptual thought and a conceptual but passive approach to perceptual experience.