Maps, Language, and the Conceptual ? Nonconceptual Distinction

AGUILERA MARIELA

Villa General Belgrano

Workshop; 2do Coloquio sobre conceptos y percepción; 2012

Centro de Investigaciones M. S. de Bournichón

One of the main arguments in favor of the language dependence of concept possession relies in the idea that the capability to make inferences requires some kind of language. This assumption has been sustained with the idea that any other kind of non linguistic vehicle is incapable of supporting inferential transitions between contents. Moreover, it has been argued that while sentences have conceptual content, maps have instead non conceptual content (Heck Jr., 2007). In this paper, I deny that the differences between those systems sustain a distinction between Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content. My argument relies in the idea that besides languages, cartographic systems can represent inferential transitions between contents. Furthermore, this pluralistic view of inferential systems leads to a pragmatic account of concepts. According to this account, having concepts depends on possessing inferential abilities instead of instantiating a particular kind of vehicle.