IDIHCS   22126
INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES EN HUMANIDADES Y CIENCIAS SOCIALES
Unidad Ejecutora - UE
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
The problem of the epistemic character of norms and values in the Putnam-Habermas? debate: A response from the theory of normativity of Clarence Irving Lewis
Autor/es:
SÁNCHEZ GARCÍA VICTORIA PAZ
Lugar:
San Pablo
Reunión:
Encuentro; 17º Encontro Internacional sobre Pragmatismo; 2017
Institución organizadora:
Pontificia Universidade Católica de São Pablo. Centro de Estudos de Pragmatismo. Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia. PUC-SP
Resumen:
The question of the relationship between normativity and valuation and its embedment in the rational discourse became a central point during the last years of my philosophical research about Clarence Irving Lewis? theory of knowledge and valuation. This issue is one of the most relevant problems in contemporary philosophy and is clearly unfold in all its complexities in the paradigmatic debate held by Hilary Putnam and Jürgen Habermas, during the first decade of the 21st century. My main purpose in this article is to sustain Lewis? theory of normativity as a fruitful response to the problem of the epistemic character of norms and values such as is addressed in the Putnam-Habermas? debate. From positions that reclaim in their own ways the tradition of American Pragmatism, Putnam and Habermas discuss the objectivity of value and normative judgements defending -with significant differences- a cognitivist position. They both agree in recognizing that ethical and value pluralism is -at least- a fact, but reject the skeptical position maintaining that the lack of agreement does not imply a lack of objectivity. In general terms, Habermas? position stems from a sharp distinction between values and norms. Concerning the former, Habermas sustains what is considered a ?weak cognitivism?, claiming that values are contingent social products whose validity?s conditions are relative to the standards of a certain community. Concerning norms, the author defends a strong cognitivism maintaining that their objectivity is the epistemic result of a rational discussion by which they acquire universal recognition. Facing this characterization, Putnam rejects what he considers an unsustainable dichotomy between values and norms, showing that any kind of relativism which could affect values would also affect norms. In this line, Putnam argues that Habermas falls into an empty formalism regarding norms that rests upon a non-cognitivism and a sociological relativism for values which, consequently, undermines his claim for universal normativity.My contribution focuses on the analysis of this discussion in order to provide a new insight from the viewpoint of Lewis? conceptualist pragmatism. My main claim is that the Lewisian perspective has the potential to offer an alternative and original answer that could account for the nature and validity of norms and values while maintaining, at the same time, a significant demarcation between both terms. In this frame, I argue that Lewis? distinction, unlike Habermas?, is not based on epistemic criteria but on pragmatic grounds, so Putnam?s main critique could be eluded. Moreover, I show that for Lewis it is valuation what gives content to normativity, so that any strategy against skepticism must begin by recognizing that judgements of value are a kind of empirical knowledge, i.e., the basis upon which normativity pragmatically emerges. Finally, I expect to lend support to the thesis that Lewis? conceptualist pragmatism offers a rich perspective for current discussions which has not been sufficiently explored; one that confronts ethical skepticism, that account for the cognitive status of values and norms, and that reclaims the rational character of ethics and valuation from a pragmatist naturalistic point of view.