Sophie?s Choice. Leibniz and Toland on l?empire de la raison

VARGAS, EVELYN

Hannover

Congreso; X. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress; 2016

Leibniz Gessellshaft

Much has been written in recent scholarship on the philosophical exchanges betweenLeibniz and Toland.1 Men of erudition but also political actors, their encounter is woveninto the political affairs of the time and the intellectual history of the Enlightment. Theiropposition to the arbitrary exercise of power is considered in relation to anepistemology of prejudice. In what follows, I will focus on a particular related issue, theepistemological analysis of reasonable belief. In order to do so, my point of departurewill be the common framework in which their positions can be contrasted. Inarticulating political action and ntellectual change, the Irish thinker aimed to loosen thenexus between the individual believer and public authority by redefining the space ofreasonable belief. The strategy presupposes a cognitive approach to faith, identifiedwith a set of doctrines. Faith doxastically conceived can be evaluated as to whether it isrationally held in terms of its epistemic justification. So Leibniz objected to Toland?sconception of belief justification for epistemological reasons that apply to both religiousbeliefs and beliefs concerning empirical objects. His proposal combined the role ofauthority in testimonial beliefs with evidential constraints.