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A better understanding of Leibniz?s views on theless than certain requires an examination of his uses of the term in connectionto the disciplinary realms within which they were discussed and defined. Byconsidering the different disciplinary contexts, and their specific aims, wewill be in a better position to identify the distinctive features of Leibniz?sconception in contrast, but also in connection to, the received views onprobability and opinion. In the following sections, I will hold that forLeibniz, ?probable? qualifies a type of arguments that must be distinguishedfrom deductive reasoning. Also, by criticizing Locke?s views in the Nouveaux Essais, the imaginary dialogueoffers the opportunity to understand Leibniz?s long-term reflections on theissue in contrast to more traditional approaches. One important point of disagreement is Locke?sview that probable inferences only have the appearance of an inferentiallinkage; their resulting consequence is not certain and therefore the object ofthe belief remains unknown. For Leibniz, if the foundation of probableinference is its ?vraisemblance? or conformity with truth, probable belief may beregarded as a form of knowledge.