Perceiving Machines. Leibniz’s Teleological Approach to Perception

VARGAS, EVELYN

Machines of Nature and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz

Springer

Lugar: Dordhecht; Año: 2010; p. 175 - 186

In recent years there has been a resurgence of debates concerning the epistemological problems of perception, particularly those related to its relevance for a naturalist conception of knowledge that can be extended to other animals and prelinguistic infants. Yet the issue is not foreign to modern philosophers. In effect, Leibniz elaborated a concept of perception that could be applied to every organic being; according to it perception is ‘...  expressio multorum in uno (A6.4.1615).’  However, this definition can be distinguished from a previous characterization in which sense perception is a case of ‘... cogitatio sui et alterius simul (A6.4.259).’ While this latter allows for causal arguments in favor of the existence of external things since the recognition of the mutual resistance between the perceptual organs and the object is the specific feature that distinguishes it from other forms of thought, it is not evident how the former definition can ground our perceptual beliefs concerning the external world. In a series of fragments dated April 20-22, 1679, Leibniz’s successive attempts to explain the emergence of new mental states can be seen as attesting the transition to his mature definition of perception; this tentative opuscule involves two different strands of thought which do not converge into a unified view on perception: sometimes his definitions emphasize the constitutive connection of actions and passions to purposes, sometimes he regards perception as a cognitive state referring to objects. Additionally, some texts devoted to the mechanical explanation of physiological functions throws light on the features of animal perception. My aim in this paper is to develop the relationship between these aspects of perceptual experience in order to understand the cognitive import involved in Leibniz’s mature conception without compromising the continuity between  rational and non-rational perceiving creatures.