The Division Problem with Voluntary Participation

ALEJANDRO NEME

Sao Paulo

Workshop; Second Brazilian Workshop of the Game Theory Society; 2010

U. de Sao Paulo

The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. The literature has implicitly assumed that agents will find acceptable any share they are assigned to. In this paper we consider the division problem when agents´ participation is voluntary. Each agent has an idiosyncratic interval of acceptable shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent either to not participate or an acceptable share because otherwise he would opt out and this would require to reassign some of the remaining agents´ shares. We study a subclass of efficient and consistent rules and characterize extensions of the uniform rule that deal explicitly with agents´ voluntary participation.