IMASL   20939
INSTITUTO DE MATEMATICA APLICADA DE SAN LUIS "PROF. EZIO MARCHI"
Unidad Ejecutora - UE
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
(Non)-convergence to stability in coalition formation games
Autor/es:
IÑARRA, ELENA ; NEME, PABLO A.; BONIFACIO, AGUSTÍN
Lugar:
Bahia Blanca
Reunión:
Congreso; JOLATE; 2019
Institución organizadora:
Universidad Nacional de Sur
Resumen:
We study coalition formation games with a non-empty core inwhich agents have preferences over coalitions. For these games, convergenceto some stable coalition structure becomes salient because in its absence adecentralized process may not lead to a stable coalition structure. In thispaper, assuming that the blockings of coalitions are myopic, wecharacterize the structures of preferences that induce a set of coalitionstructures trapped in a close cycle precluding to reach a stable one.