IMASL 20939
INSTITUTO DE MATEMATICA APLICADA DE SAN LUIS "PROF. EZIO MARCHI"
Unidad Ejecutora - UE
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-proof
Autor/es:
JORDI MASSO; ALEJANDRO NEME; R. PABLO ARRIBILLAGA
Reunión:
Workshop; Workshop en Teoría de Juegos y Elección Social; 2018
Resumen:
For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991)we show that all sequential allotment rules, identi?ed by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, e¢ cient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
