Constructing q-cyclic games with unique prefixed equilibrium

ALANIZ SARA AND QUINTAS LUIS

Bahia Blanca, Argenitna

Congreso; X Jornadas Latinoamericanas de Teoria Economica - JOLATE; 2009

JOLATE

In this work we construct a wide family of q-cyclic n-person games (Marchi and Quintas (1983)) with unique prefixed Nash equilibrium points. We extend the constructions given for bimatrix games by Marchi and Quintas (1987) and Quintas (1988 a). We prove the uniqueness of equilibrium for a wide family of completely mixed  q-cyclic game and  also for a family of not completely mixed q-cyclic game, with each players having n strategies, being only m (m<n) of them active strategies.