Pareto dominant strategy-proof rules with multiple commodities

AGUSTÍN G. BONIFACIO

Salta

Congreso; L Reunión Anual de la Asociación Argentina de Economía Política; 2015

Facultad de Ciencias Económicas - Universidad Nacional de Salta

We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with a social endowment ofperfectly divisible commodities and multidimensional single-peaked preferences. Using the property of replacement monotonicity, we: (i) establish sufficient conditions for a rule to be Pareto dominant strategy-proof; (ii) present a multidimensional version of the sequential rules introduced by Barber`a, Jackson and Neme [6] and show that they also are Pareto dominant strategy-proof; and (iii) give a new characterization of the multidimensional uniform rule with this notion of Pareto domination.These results generalize previous work of Anno and Sasaki [4], that only applies to the two-agent case.