IMASL   20939
INSTITUTO DE MATEMATICA APLICADA DE SAN LUIS "PROF. EZIO MARCHI"
Unidad Ejecutora - UE
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
“The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria”.
Autor/es:
JAUME D. MASSÓ J. AND NEME A.
Lugar:
Evanston, Illinois. USA.
Reunión:
Congreso; Third World Congress of the Game Theory Society. GAMES 2008; 2008
Institución organizadora:
Northwestern University.
Resumen:
Abstract: A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence using linear programming. We show that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all equilibrium assignments, and vice versa. We also show that the set of equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure and we study how this structure is translated into the set of agents´ utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.