Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences

AGUSTÍN G. BONIFACIO

Córdoba

Congreso; IV Congreso Latinoamericano de Matemáticos; 2012

Facultad de Matemática, Astronomía y Física, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba

We study reallocation rules in the context of a one-good economy consisting of agents with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments. We identify all the reallocation rules that are immune to strategic behavior in a very general way: the bribe-proof rules. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their characteristics (preferences or endowments) in order that all of them get better off (strictly when misreporting) after an appropriate redistribution of what the rule reallocates to the group, adjusted by the resource surplus or deficit they all engage in by misreporting endowments. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of e±cient, strategy-proof (via preferences and endowments) and weakly replacement monotonic rules, extending the result due to Massó and Neme (Games and Economic Behavior, 2007) to our broader framework. Also, we present a full description of the family of bribe-proof rules that in addition are individually rational and peak-only. Finally, two further characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule involving bribe-proofness are provided.