IMASL   20939
INSTITUTO DE MATEMATICA APLICADA DE SAN LUIS "PROF. EZIO MARCHI"
Unidad Ejecutora - UE
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
Core of Balanced Family Games
Autor/es:
ROBERTO P. ARRIBILLAGA
Lugar:
San Luis
Reunión:
Workshop; Cooperation Matching and Collective Goods; 2011
Institución organizadora:
Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis
Resumen:
In this paper, we introduce the balanced family games in the same way that Kaneko and Wooders(1982) introduced the partitioning games. Given a finite set N of players, there is an a priori given set of coalitions of N and only coalitions in play an essential role. The balanced family
games propose that players could be organized towards balanced families take from instead of only partitioning like it is supposed in the partitioning game approaches. In contrast with partitioning game results, the balanced family games always have a non empty core. Furthermore in that cases in which the partitioning games have non empty core, this coincides with the core of the corresponding balanced family game. The conditions, over , for nonemptiness of the cores of all partitioning games with essential coalitions in , appear extremely restrictive. However Kaneko and Wooders (1982) proved that when the game is replicated approximate cores are nonempty .
We show that the approximate cores of partitioning games tend to the core of the corresponding unreplicated balanced family games.