Bribe-proof Reallocation with Single-peaked Preferences

AGUSTÍN G. BONIFACIO

San Luis

Workshop; Workshop: Cooperation, Matching and Collective Goods; 2011

Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis

We study reallocation rules in the context of an economy consisting of agents with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments, which are private information. We extend the characterization due to Massó and Neme [6] to this environment and identify all the reallocation rules that are immune to strategic behavior in a very general way: the bribe-proof rules. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their characteristics (either preferences or endowments, or both) in order that all of them obtain a weakly referred amount and agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred amount, after an appropriate redistribution of what the rule reallocates to the group adjusted by the resource surplus or deficit they engage in by misreporting. Bribe-proofness includes as special cases known and widely studied non-manipulation properties such as strategy-proofness (via preferences), withholding-proofness and borrowing-proofness. As a consequence of our characterization we show that the uniform reallocation rule is bribe-proof. Finally, we observe that bribe-proofness cannot be extended to the domain of mixed ownership economies.