Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences

AGUSTÍN G. BONIFACIO

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE

Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

Año: 2015 vol. 44 p. 617 - 638

0176-1714

We study reallocation rules in the context of a one-good economy consisting of agents with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments. A rule is "bribe-proof" if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their characteristics (preferences or endowments) in order that each agent is better off after an appropriate redistribution of what the rule reallocates to the group, adjusted by the resource surplus or deficit they all engage in by misreporting endowments. First, we characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, (preference and endowment) strategy-proof and weakly replacement monotonic rules, extending the result due to Massó and Neme (Games Econ Behav 61: 331?343, 2007) to our broader framework. Second, we present a full description of the family of bribe-proof rules that in addition are individually rational and peak-only. Finally, we provide two further characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule involving bribe-proofness.