IMASL 20939
INSTITUTO DE MATEMATICA APLICADA DE SAN LUIS "PROF. EZIO MARCHI"
Unidad Ejecutora - UE
artículos
Título:
Stable Solutions on Matching Models with Quota Restriction
Autor/es:
FEMENÍA, DELFINA; MARÍ, MABEL; NEME, ALEJANDRO JOSE; JORGE ARMANDO OVIEDO
Revista:
International Game Theory Review
Editorial:
World Scientific
Referencias:
Año: 2010
ISSN:
0219-1989
Resumen:
In this Paper we present a special matching market, where an Institutions has to hire a set of pairs of complementary workers, and has a quota that is the maximum number of candidates pair positions to be filled. We define a natural stable solution and first show that in the unrestricted Institution preferences domain, the set of stable solution may be empty and second we obtain a complete characterization of the stable sets under responsive restriction of the institution´s preference.
