Agregación de relaciones de ataque entre argumentos

TOHMÉ, FERNANDO ABEL; BODANZA, GUSTAVO ADRIÁN

La Falda, Córdoba

Workshop; Encuentro de Temas de Lógica; 2006

An argumentation framework is a system formed by a set of arguments and a relation of attack among them. This paper deals with the possibility of aggregating different relations of attack among the same arguments. While each attack relation represents an individual agent’s criterion, the aggregation is a function obtaining a collective criterion. Arrow defined an extensively studied set of constraints that any aggregation function over individual preferences must verify for qualifying as rational. We will show that once Arrow’s constraints become incorporated in the framework the algebraic structure of a proper prefilter over the class of winning coalitions of agents arises. As it has been discussed in Social Choice Theory, a prefilter indicates the existence of a collegium of attack relations, meaning that each member by itself cannot determine the outcome of the aggregation process, but can instead veto the alternatives that run contrary to its prescription.