Aggregation of attack relations: a social-choice theoretical analysis of defeasible

BODANZA, GUSTAVO ADRIÁN

Selección de trabajos de las XII Jornadas de Epistemología de las Ciencias Económicas

CIECE

Lugar: Buenos Aires; Año: 2007; p. 45 - 48

This paper analyzes the aggregation of different abstract attack relations over a common set of arguments. Each of those attack relations can be considered as the representation of {\em criterion} of warrant. It is well known in the field of Social Choice Theory that if some ``fairness'' conditions are impossed over an aggregation of preferences,  it becomes impossible to yield a result. In the case of attack relations, instead, a positive result may ensue, namely that if the class of winning coalitions in an aggregation process by pairwaise voting is a {\em proper prefilter} an outcome exists. This outcome may preserve some features of the competing attack relations, like acicylicity. The downside of this is that in fact the resulting attack relation must be a portion common to the ``hidden dictators'' in the system, that is, all the attack relations that belong to all the winning coalitions.